Bitbutter

A long list of miracles are attributed to Sai Baba, for instance it is claimed that he 'materialised' a live monkey during an interview–he maintains that this was no conjuring trick, but that he was using devine power. Why don't I believe him? Because I believe that 'extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence', and I'm not aware of extraordinary evidence that supports Sai Baba's claim.

If James Randi were to set up a controlled test of Sai Baba's powers, and was unable to demonstrate that he is a fraud, I would assign a greater likelihood to the possibility that Sai Baba is telling the truth. But in the absence of such a test it doesn't seem premature to assume that there is nothing paranormal going on. My guess is that most of us would agree.

Which seems more likely to you:

1. The reports are true; Sai Baba performs miracles
2. There is some other explanation for the fact that thousands of people claim that he performs miracles

Which seems more likely to you:

1. The miracles that Joseph Smith (the father of Mormonism) described really happened
2. The miracles that Joseph Smith described didn't happen

Which seems more likely to you:

1. The miracles described in the Qur'an really happened
2. The Qur'anic miracles didn't really happen

Which seems more likely to you:

1. The miracles ascribed to Krisha really happened
2. Krisha's miracles didn't really happen

Which seems more likely to you:

1. The miracles described in the bible really happened
2. The biblical miracles didn't really happen

David Hume pointed out that inductive inferences are not rational, but arise from custom and habit. One way to illustrate this is to think of whether the sun will rise tomorrow. Most of us will agree that the sun is more likely to rise tomorrow than it is not to rise.

But which ever way we explain our judgment about the likelihood of a sunrise, all our explanations depend on the assumption that the future will resemble the past in a fundamental way. To give a more concrete example: We assume that the laws of physics we understand today won't be radically contradicted by how things behave tomorrow.

But what are these assumptions based on? How can we know that the laws of physics that explain the earth's rotation will still hold tomorrow? It seems that we can't claim to know these things, and it's not immediately obvious how we can even assign probabilities to them.

It can feel unsatisfying to think that our expectations about the future are inherently irrational. The presuppositionalist thinks that he has a way out. He believes that a god exists who has promised to maintain the uniformity of nature. We can take the the uniformity of nature to mean that the future will resembling the past in some fundamental way.

There are at least two distinct kinds of problem with this 'solution' though, either of which invalidate it. They can be summarised as follows:

1. We can't trust a god's promise without using induction. So if you're using God's word to justify induction, you're begging the question.

2. Even if nature is uniform, this isn't enough to provide a rational justification for induction, as illustrated by the black swan example.

How to trust God's promise?

According to the presuppositionalist, God has promised to maintain the uniformity of nature, which is needed if inductive inferences are ever going to turn out to be true.

God is all powerful and his word is final so that might seem to settle things. But even if we ignore the so-called biblical evidence which plainly shows that god often changes his mind and breaks his promises, it's not as simple as that.

How do we know to trust someone's promise? In deciding about their trustworthiness we take things into consideration about the one who's making the promise: a particularly important consideration is whether the promise-maker has broken or kept his promises in the past.

To see that this applies even if we're considering a divine promise-maker, think about how you'd react to a new promise from a god who'd made many promises in the past, and broken all of them; even his most devout worshiper would be a fool to trust him.

So the presuppositionalist uses the ideas he has about how his god behaved in the past and comes to the conclusion that god is very unlikely to break his promise about the uniformity of nature in the future. He's using induction.

God never lied to me in the past, therefore God won't lie to me in the future.

But remember that induction is the very thing the presuppositionalist wanted to justify in the first place. The presuppositionalist might protest that he's not really using induction to know that god won't lie. He might say that he knows God won't lie because it's not in God's nature to lie. But all he's done is generate a different inductive equation:

God's nature was X in the past therefore God's nature will be X in the future

Whichever way he chooses to explain his trust in God's word, the presuppositionalist uses induction in his solution. He's assuming what he sets out to prove. This is a fallacy called begging the question. Any defense of rational induction that depends on a god's promise falls into the same trap.

The insufficiency of the UON

The second problem is that even if we know that nature is uniform, we still haven't done anything to provide rational basis for induction. It seems that the only way we could be certain that an inductive inference would turn out to be true is if the universe was uniform, and we knew everything about it. And this is clearly not the case.

While there are things we don't know about the universe, we can never be sure our inductive inferences will turn out to be true. Perhaps the sun, according to some previously unknown feature of our uniform universe will vanish before the sunrise we predicted has had a chance to happen.

All swans we have seen are white, therefore all swans are white

Induction in a uniform universe can, and does, give false results. Karl Popper's example of the black swan illustrates this. So the uniformity of nature, while being necessary in order for us to gain any advantage from our habit of induction, is useless if you want to establish a rational basis for inductive reasoning.

See all posts relating to presuppositionalism.

I found this short response to my article on presuppositionalism in my incoming links. Here's an excerpt.

I believe that both theists and atheists accept certain premises on faith and that acknowledging that they do so is better than dissembling, equivocating, and wrapping oneself in blankets of deliberate ambiguity.

It's misleading to equate the foundational assumptions (the 'puddle jumps') that make rational inquiry possible with the leaps that religious people make, even if they appear to be of the same type.

Daylight Atheism's commentary on one of the exchanges in the debate between Sam Harris and Andrew Sullivan explains this perfectly.

Science rests as well on some basic elements of faith…. These little puddle-jumps of faith are the foundation for your reason. I think they are justified. But that reason is really, au fond, a belief, an act of faith, an acknowledgment that, as humans, we have no "contingency-free" place from where to start at all and no "contingency-free" place on earth to end up at.

No, no, a thousand times no. Science, like every human endeavor, can deliver only provisional and not absolute truth about the world we live in, and can be sidetracked by human fallibility and ego. But this categorically does not mean that science is no better than any other way of knowing invented or alleged by humans, nor does it mean that its conclusions are no more certain than any religious assertion based on faith. Despite its faults, science is still by far the most and indeed the only reliable way of knowing we have ever discovered. The exponential growth of scientific knowledge, compared to the eternal stagnation of religion, should alone lay this silly trope to rest. Harris dismantles it with razor-keen wit:

…the fact that Hume's worries make sense, the fact that Wittgenstein can say things like "our spade is turned," does not place every spurious claim to knowledge on an equal footing with science. The discomfort induced in mathematics by Godel does not make the doctrine of Mormonism even slightly more plausible. There is still a difference between jumping a puddle and walking on water.

Basic

Theists who subscribe to the presuppositionalist school of thought say that atheists can't 'account for' inductive reasoning. They claim that in fact, whenever an atheist uses inductive reasoning, she is borrowing from the Christian world view, because according to them, it's the only world view that can 'account for' the the uniformity of nature, which is needed for inductive reasoning to work.

But, even if the Christian is correct in his claim that an atheist can't 'account for' a given facet of nature that she nevertheless depends upon; this is not the urgent, deal breaking problem that the presuppositionalist tends to paint it as.

Imagine a primitive society where most people believe that spirit ancestors reward the ritual act of watering a plant by causing that plant to grow. A person in this society who didn't believe in the existence of spirit ancestors would still go ahead and water his plants because otherwise they would die.

The skeptic's peers might ask him: 'how can you account for the fact that applying water causes the plant to grow in your world view?'. The skeptic, ignorant of plant biology, would have no answer. His peers might then say 'Every time you water your plants you're borrowing from our world view, because ours is the only system that can account for the connection between applying water to a plant, and that plant's growth'.

I hope the points I wanted to illustrate with this analogy are already clear, but I'll spell them out:

1. Having an explanation does not make your position superior to that of those who may lack one.
2. Not being able to explain a phenomenon doesn't preclude you from legitimately assuming the reliability of that phenomenon
3. Assuming the reliability of a phenomenon without being able to 'account for' it does not mean that you implicitly accept the world view of people claiming that theirs is the only explanation of that phenomenon.
4. The failure of a person to explain a phenomenon doesn't invalidate their world view or render it inconsistent.
5. Acknowledging that you don't have an answer is better than making things up.

Extra credit

Presuppositionalists hold that a theistic world view is the only one that can account for knowledge. In particular, they claim that atheists cannot justify their use of inductive reasoning while God provides a firm epistemological basis, in other words a firm foundation for knowledge.

Uniformity of Nature

The Uniformity of Nature (or the UN as it's often abbreviated) is the name given to the apparent consistency of the universe's physical laws over space and time. Without Uniformity of Nature, the universe would be a chaotic place where the past wouldn't resemble the future.

Inductive reasoning

To use Inductive Reasoning is to make an estimate of how likely a general statement is to be true based on specific knowledge. Inductive reasoning is used when trying to predict future events from knowledge of the past. In a universe without Uniformity of Nature, where the past didn't resemble the future at all, inductive reasoning would be useless.

Presuppositionalists say that god guarantees the Uniformity of nature, and in doing so, provides justification for inductive reasoning.

Van Til, one of the most well known presuppositionalists said:

the existence of the God of Christian theism and the conception of his counsel as controlling all things in the universe is the only presupposition which can account for the uniformity of nature which the scientist needs.

Fallacy 1: The uniformity of nature needs 'accounting for'

When Van Til says that the uniformity of nature needs accounting for he assumes that a chaotic universe is more likely than a uniform one, and that a god is necessary to provide uniformity. But since van til has never seen a universe other than the one we all live in, this is an unfounded assumption. For all we know, it may not be possible for a godless universe to be anything but uniform.

Fallacy 2: The Biblical God is the only presupposition that can 'account for' the uniformity of nature

Far from the Christian god being the only presupposition that can 'account for' the uniformity of nature, it's one of many. There are an infinite number of unlikely sounding assumptions that 'account for' the uniformity of nature such as 'the flying spaghetti monster guarantees the uniformity of nature', or 'the biblical god guarantees the uniformity of nature'. There are also some far more parsimonious presuppositions. Perhaps the simplest one is 'UN is true'.

Fallacy 3: The uniformity of nature is enough to justify inductive reasoning

Presuppositionalists think they have a firm foundation of knowledge that the rest of us lack. But here they are making a double error, because as well as mistakenly believing that the uniformity of nature needs 'accounting for' they seem to believe that the uniformity of nature is sufficient to provide a rational basis for inductive reasoning, when it isn't.

Even in a universe with UN, inductive reasoning can never be epistemologically justified: just because the pen dropped to the floor yesterday doesn't mean that a previously unknown universal law will prevent it from falling to the ground today.

Fallacy 4: Christians can justify the use of induction without begging the question

To demonstrate that the atheist has no basis for assuming the validity of inductive reason, the presuppositionalist asks how we can know that the universe will continue to be uniform. If the answer involves appealing to knowledge of the past then it uses induction to try to validate induction, which is begging the question. The presuppositionalist mistakenly thinks he has a solution to this problem: through revelation, God lets him know that the universe will continue to be uniform.

But how can he be sure that God won't change his mind about UN? The presuppositionalist might cite God's unchanging nature as a guarantee that he won't change his mind.

But what grounds does the Christian have to conclude that god's nature is in fact unchanging?, and that it will continue to be so? Whether he gained knowledge of god's unchanging nature through direct revelation or through scripture, the only way he can say anything about God's nature in the future is to use induction. Appealing to god to solve the problem of induction merely postpones the point at which induction has to be invoked to justify itself–thereby begging the question. Presuppositionalists can't rationally justify their use of induction any more than the rest of us can.

See all posts relating to presuppositionalism.

Incinerating presuppositionalism

An easy argument to refute: Van Tillian, Calvinist, Presuppositionalism

Don't respect my beliefs.

Be courteous and patient towards me while you do your best to demolish them, and I'll try to do the same.

Imagine that you're carefully explaining to a member of the flat earth society why you're convinced that the earth is roughly spherical. You wouldn't be doing him any favours if you respected his belief; if you did, you wouldn't be able to show him why he's wrong.

Is it even meaningful to talk about respecting a belief that you are convinced is false? I don't think it is. It seems to me that 'respect for peoples beliefs' is often nothing more than a virtuous sounding code phrase that really means "anything for a quiet life".

Are there any beliefs deserving of respect? I don't think so. Even beliefs which it's widely agreed are true, or ones held by people who you trust, or ones you're personally convinced about the truth of. If we expose all ideas to thorough analysis and criticism, the best ones will survive and we'll be learning.

When we 'respect' each others beliefs we rob ourselves of the chance to learn, to test our reasoning and to get to know one another by talking frankly about the things that are most important to us.

So don't respect my beliefs, and I promise I won't respect yours.

http://uk.youtube.com/watch?v=prTC-ZvsHgU

If you're an atheist please consider supporting the OUT campaign launched by Richard Dawkins. As a start you could buy a teeshirt, or add the A logo to your website.

I admit, I sympathize with those sceptics on this site who fear that we are engendering a quasi-religious conformity of our own. Whether we like it or not, I'm afraid we have to swallow this small amount of pride if we are to have an influence on the real world, otherwise we'll never overcome the 'herding cats' problem.

Politicians follow where the votes are. They can only count atheists who are OUT. Some atheists are defeatist in thinking we'll never be effective simply because we're not a majority. But it doesn't matter that we're not a majority. To be effective, all we have to be is recognizable to legislators as a big enough minority. Atheists are more numerous than religious Jews, yet they wield a tiny fraction of the political power, apparently because they have never got their act together in the way the Jewish lobby so brilliantly has: the famous 'herding cats' problem again. And the argument applies not just to politicians but to advertisers, the media, merchants across the board. Anyone who wants to sell us anything caters to demographics. We need to stand up and be counted, so that the demographically savvy culture will come to reflect our tastes and our views. That in turn makes it easier for the next generation of atheists.

–Richard Dawkins

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Wars, invasions, civil strife and genocide are not caused by religion. Nor are they caused by atheism, rationality or science. Every war in history has been fought for the same reasons - power, influence, control of wealth, control of resources (including human resources). Some people attempt to exercise power by wielding religious belief. Some attempt to exercise power by wielding political ideology. Some attempt to exercise power by wielding money. Some by claiming legal or moral authority. But it's all about power and influence in the end.

.. says AllyF in one of the hundreds of posts in a recent Guardian Unlimited thread. This is a sentiment I've seen expressed many times lately, and i can understand its appeal. There's something elegant about the idea that all the bad behaviour in the world can and should be traced back to, and ultimately blamed on, human desire for power. Maybe it's true, but even if we grant that, it doesn't mean we can't or shouldn't point out much more nearby causes as well.

Continue reading…

I was reading a transcript from a debate in the house of lords. Something that Baroness Andrews said prompted me to reply. I'm posting my reply here too.

My noble friend Lady Massey and the noble Lord, Lord Roberts of Llandudno, alleged that religion is sometimes seen to cause and be at the root of conflict. I say right away that it is not belief that impacts so negatively on us or society more broadly, it is the actions and manifestations by small numbers of people who distort religious texts or hold fanatical views. It is essential that we make, understand and express those differences.

I strongly disagree. There are a number of serious problems with the idea that it is people's distortion of religious texts that leads them to act in anti social ways.

Firstly how can you determine that any of a set of rival interpretations of religious texts is a 'distortion'?

Secondly, taken at face value, the bible contains plenty of justification for 'fanatical' behaviour. To claim the bible as a guide for your life and yet to hold moderate views compatible with modern society is actually more of a distortion than to be interpret the book literally like the fundamentalists do.

Baroness Andrews' charge that certain groups distort religious texts is a non starter. We are outraged by fanatics not because they distort religious texts–religious texts are for the most part appalling guides for how to lead a moral life in the first place–but because their behaviour strongly disagrees with the moral zeitgeist.

Why the reluctance to acknowledge the (to me) plain fact that faith–certainty without evidence–is to blame for religious fanaticism?

Faith can be benign, usually to the extent that it is tempered with skepticism. Faith can also do terrible damage. The more certainty with which an article of faith is held, and the more explicit that article is, the more dangerous that faith makes a person.

Add your thoughts here.