However, you conceded on your first point which had him dead in the water.

This statement……
"one *presupposes* the existence of a God whose very nature is one of order, consistency, and truth. "

This is an imaginary god that he just made up.
It is like a mathamatical formula with no unknowns.

I can presuppose a god of disorder, inconsistency and untruth.
Who am I to tell GOD what she can or cannot be or do.

He certainly did not get this god from the Bible, Koran, or any other religious book.

I can presuppose that some undiscovered planet in the sirus system has intelligent life on it, are you going to concede that to me? And by the way my god lives on this planet, and she created the universe.
If you do, then we will have nothing but MY imagination to debate, and you cannot win that debate, because my mind has all the evidense it needs to believe these things.

And, if my concept of god came from the bible why would anyone of SOUND mind presuppose that god had only these qualities (order, consistency, and truth), considering god made man in his image?

Man has these qualities, but man also has many other qualities that do not jibe with his presuppositions about the nature of god!

Other than mans lack of power to perform supernatural events, man and the god of the bible have all the same emotions, and faults, except god's are on a grander scale.

Please e-mail me what you think about my comment.

Dale701

There doesn't have to be a reason that things in the past have always (as far as I'm aware) followed patterns (gravity, +/- attraction, et cetera), but they have. You can't even really prove that there was a past. Thinking doesn't even prove a past because at any instant I could just start existing with a bunch of memories and only exist for an instant.

This shows that, despite what you say, you do indeed assume the supernatural cannot exist. You have ruled out its possibility by disallowing discussion of the supernatural, because you have taken as your starting point the "fact" that only the natural exists. Your presuppositions lead you to your conclusion.

There are explanations for the supernatural out there, if you are willing to look for them. But you seem closed to the possibility, because, as I keep pointing out but you continue to deny, you have already ruled out the possibility from the start.

As to the TAG, its argument is that a purely naturalist universe leads one to moral and logical absurdity, and is rationally incoherent. At bottom, the atheist must admit that he simply cannot rationally account for things like the laws of logic, moral norms, uniformity of nature, or any other preconditions of knowledge that make reality intelligible. Without these, we can know nothing at all (and the Uniformity of Nature is something that must be presumed to be true by any scientist, even if its nature disallows 100% accuracy; this is why the Grue problem is not a real problem). The theist has a rational explanation. It may not be an explanation atheists like, but it is rational nonetheless. This is why the theist is perfectly justified in claiming that his worldview is rationally superior to the atheist worldview.

My starting point does not…specify that the Supernatural can't exist. But until someone offers a coherent explanation of exactly what these things are, their non-existence has to be assumed.

You said:

You contradict yourself. You say you don't assume the supernatural doesn't exist, yet you must assume the supernatural doesn't exist. Why must you assume the supernatural doesn't exist?

There is no contradiction there if you read it carefully. I don't assume that the Supernatural can't exist. Just as I don't assume that lobsters can't exist. But my starting point is that I have no knowledge about what either of these things are supposed to be. Not knowing what a lobster is, it's senseless to suppose that whatever that label refers to, exists. The same applies to the supernatural. First somebody needs to explain what it is.

I could present you with, e.g., evidence of what many deem to be a miracle, yet because of your naturalist assumptions, you will search for a naturalistic explanation–and if one is lacking, you will not immediately believe. Instead, you will wait for a naturalistic explanation to unfurl sometime in the unknown future. […] This is why examining one's presuppositions is crucial to this discussion, rather than simply asserting that further "facts" or "evidence" will change one's mind. It won't.

It's a risky tactic to tell your opponent what he thinks, instead of asking him. You got it wrong. I reject miracle stories not because I presuppose that miracles can't happen, but because the nature of my firm everyday experience leads be to attribute an extremely low initial likelihood to miracle claims. I attribute a very low initial likelihood to other things too if they don't sit well with my past experience.

Despite all this, if I had access to very strong evidence, I would come to believe that a miracle did happen. Though I still wouldn't be any the wiser about what the supernatural is supposed to be.

You define everything in terms of the natural–but how do you know that it is not the other way around? […] except by circular reference to itself.

As soon as someone can explain what 'the supernatural' is, I can give the question serious consideration.

In answer to my question about how the rational can arise from the blind, impersonal, and irrational, you ask, "Why assume that they cannot?" and say, essentially, "That's just how it is." Again, this is not a rational explanation.

I'm not offering "That's just how it is" as an explanation. I hoped to convey the idea that while can say a lot about how the rational arose in the universe, we don't have the complete picture. The lack of a complete alternative account in no way obliges anyone to accept the theist's explanatorily useless, ad hoc answer which reduces to 'God did it, somehow'.

I assume nothing to be magical. The theist takes as his starting point the existence of the supernatural. There is nothing "magical" about the supernatural;

What you just said is exactly as meaningless to me as the following paragraph:

I assume nothing to be supernatural. I take as my starting point the existence of the magical. There is nothing "supernatural" about the magical; it has always existed, and underlies everything we understand about the world.

Magical and supernatural: both words are invoked when a person wishes to claim that an event occurred by no mechanism, or that the mechanism is forever out of the reach of science. Since neither label has been explained I've taken my cue from how they are used and consider them to be interchangeable.

Again, the TAG is not a "God of the gaps" argument.

The pattern is: Ask a question that the atheist does not have a complete answer for. Point out that theism answers that question. Imply that theism is therefore superior.

TAG is a variant of God of the Gaps because it depends on ignoring the fact that 'we don't know' is a good answer, and may be preferable to an incorrect one.

You contradict yourself. You say you don't assume the supernatural doesn't exist, yet you must assume the supernatural doesn't exist. Why must you assume the supernatural doesn't exist? Why must the theist accept your starting point that we must begin with the natural? You begin with the presupposition that all that exists is the natural, and think that only if there is sufficient "evidence" for the supernatural will you believe. But if you've read W.V.O. Quine, Wittgenstein, or any number of 20th century epistemologists, you know that this is simply not the way these things proceed. I could present you with, e.g., evidence of what many deem to be a miracle, yet because of your naturalist assumptions, you will search for a naturalistic explanation–and if one is lacking, you will not immediately believe. Instead, you will wait for a naturalistic explanation to unfurl sometime in the unknown future. This is always how atheists respond to "evidence" for belief; their presuppositions are fundamentally opposed to the possibility of the supernatural, and therefore any so-called evidence is never sufficient, because they will always wait for a naturalistic explanation to come along. Even if one never does, they will continue to wait in *faith* for a naturalistic explanation. This is why examining one's presuppositions is crucial to this discussion, rather than simply asserting that further "facts" or "evidence" will change one's mind. It won't.

[S]upernaturalists have failed to tell us anything about the imagined set that includes both the natural and whatever else there is, except in terms of the natural.

Once again, your naturalist presuppositions rear their head. You define everything in terms of the natural–but how do you know that it is not the other way around? How do you know that the universe is rather a reflection of the supernatural? That the laws of logic, for instance, reflect the mind of God, or that nature displays a certain order after the internal consistency of God? You see, once again, you presuppose the naturalist position in order to prove it, while the theist rejects your presuppositions and assumes everything is defined in terms of the *supernatural*. Your naturalist presuppositions are so hardwired into your thinking that you simply cannot accept the possibility that, philosophically speaking, it's just *one* worldview that in no way obligates anyone else to accept it. It cannot be proven, except by circular reference to itself.

In answer to my question about how the rational can arise from the blind, impersonal, and irrational, you ask, "Why assume that they cannot?" and say, essentially, "That's just how it is." Again, this is not a rational explanation. That is fine if this is the position you take, but it is not a rationally coherent position. Let's at least be clear on this.

You then say, "Natural selection answers a huge part of this puzzle." Again, this doesn't answer the question. Are you saying, then, that natural selection is guided by a rational force? If so, what is this mysterious force, in a universe that is supposedly made of blind, impersonal, irrational forces?

How can God inject logic into the universe? If I repeatedly ask for you to explain your answers you'll quickly be forced to say "I don't know" too.

Actually, I can provide a rational explanation. God does not "inject" logic into anything. The theist believes God has created all things, and that the human beings especially bear the imprint of God. Our minds therefore reflect the rationality of God. We are born with it, and our thinking reflects the thinking of God. This is a rational account for the laws of logic. You may not *like* the account, but it is a rational one, nonetheless.

You assume that certain things in the universe are magical.

I assume nothing to be magical. The theist takes as his starting point the existence of the supernatural. There is nothing "magical" about the supernatural; it has always existed, and underlies everything we understand about the world. Once again, your naturalist presuppositions reject this outright. But why should the theist accept your naturalist presuppositions?

Again, the TAG is not a "God of the gaps" argument. It is a transcendental argument, and takes the form: X is a precondition of Y. Y exists, therefore X must exist. The "God of the gaps" argument has more to do with providing an evidential explanation for certain observable phenomena. I don't hold to a "God of the gaps" theory for scientific phenomena, and I think it's a faulty argument.

T'his is only the case if you presume that anything beyond the natural is unintelligible, which presumes that nothing beyond the natural exists. But why should I take your presuppositions as true? You take as your starting point that we can have no knowledge outside of the natural; but why should I accept your starting point as true?

You're mischaracterising my position. My starting point does not include the specification that Quaddle can't exist. Nor does it specify that the Supernatural can't exist. But until someone offers a coherent explanation of exactly what these things are, their non-existence has to be assumed.

The rest of your opening paragraph reads something like this to me:

The Quaddlist from the outset rejects the idea that knowledge beyond the Quaddle-less is impossible, because we are born with the "imprint" of the Quaddle, and it is thus intelligible to us. There is nothing contradictory about this if one presumes that Quaddle exists. It is only contradictory if one takes as his starting point–as you do–that only a purely Quaddle-less universe exists.

Before the claims of the supernaturalist can be taken seriously, he has to explain what the supernatural is.

And 'Beyond the natural' is meaningless, not because I simply assume that the natural is all there is, but because supernaturalists have failed to tell us anything about the imagined set that includes both the natural and whatever else there is, except in terms of the natural.

In other words they have shown themselves to be incapable of specifying a universe of discourse that leaves anything over once the natural is subtracted.

Logic

I agree that logic is hardwired into our brains, but not as a result of blind, impersonal, non-rational forces (after all, how can blind, impersonal, non-rational forces give rise to the rational?).

Why assume that they cannot? It's only your assumption that rationality has to be something magical that leads you to say this kind of thing. In fact, the standard presup arguments follow the same form: How can something magical exist in a universe without magic?

In my experience here's how the conversation tends to go on: The naturalists answer, in each case, is that the thing in question is not magical, and so can exist in a non-magical universe. At this point the naturalist has 'accounted for' the thing that the presupper insists that they cannot account for. The apologetic has been defeated, and the remainder of the discussion consists of the presupper resisting the obvious fact that his 'explanation' for these things (God did it) is in no way a better explanation than the one the naturalist has given.

Back to your question again:

after all, how can blind, impersonal, non-rational forces give rise to the rational?)

Natural selection answers a huge part of this puzzle. But there are still gaps in our knowledge. We don't have a full understanding of how the brain works, or how it evolved. So if you recursively ask for explanations of a naturalists initial answer, there'll come a point at which they will say "i don't know".

How can God inject logic into the universe? If I repeatedly ask for you to explain your answers you'll quickly be forced to say "I don't know" too.

You assume that certain things in the universe are magical. This assumption leads you to reject accounts of these things that don't include magic. The irony is that, as a presuppositionalist, you should be in a better position than most to realise that it's your presuppositions that lead you to conclude that non-magical accounts for these things can't be valid. Presup fails because it's practitioners import assumptions from their own w/view when trying to show failings of other w/views. Their attempts at internally critiquing atheistic w/views are all spoiled by this oversight.

So there are two main problems with your approach (presup)

1. No matter how strenuously presuppositionists deny it, the presup apologetic relies on the God of the Gaps fallacy. As with the lightening storm example, an honest "I don't know" is better than making stuff up (God did it). This example makes it obvious that an inability to 'account for' an aspect of existence that the person takes for granted does not invalidate a persons w/view.

2. Naturalists are perfectly capable of 'accounting for' the things that presuppositionalists challenge them to explain. Presuppositionalists don't like the answers because they don't depend on magic, but in the context of an internal critique of naturalism, the presuppositionalist is powerless to mount a valid objection to the naturalist's account.

Uniformity of Nature

You'll have to clarify your meaning here, because as it is, it makes no sense. The assumption of the uniformity of nature is precisely the assumption that the future will continue to resemble the past in a predictable way.

I hope you'll take a second look at the Grue problem. I think you'll see why it shows that assuming UoN doesn't provide rational justification for the belief that the future will resemble the past in a predictable way.

What is the supernatural? until an answer is attempted you may as well be saying: "the very conditions on which natural reality is made intelligible can only be rationally justified by reference to the unintelligable."

T'his is only the case if you presume that anything beyond the natural is unintelligible, which presumes that nothing beyond the natural exists. But why should I take your presuppositions as true? You take as your starting point that we can have no knowledge outside of the natural; but why should I accept your starting point as true? The theist from the outset rejects the idea that knowledge beyond the natural is impossible, because we are born with the "imprint" of the supernatural, and it is thus intelligible to us. There is nothing contradictory about this if one presumes the supernatural exists. It is only contradictory if one takes as his starting point–as you do–that only a purely naturalist universe exists.

Logic
In my view the 'laws' of classical logic, the rules of thought, are hardwired by natural selection. Their presence is the consequence of our brains having evolved in a universe which behaves in a way that is (so far) reflected by those principles.

I agree that logic is hardwired into our brains, but not as a result of blind, impersonal, non-rational forces (after all, how can blind, impersonal, non-rational forces give rise to the rational?).

Science is useful as long as the future continues to resemble the past in a predictable way. The truth or falsehood of UoN is irrelevant to this fact.

You'll have to clarify your meaning here, because as it is, it makes no sense. The assumption of the uniformity of nature is precisely the assumption that the future will continue to resemble the past in a predictable way.

You say that as part of my foundational assumptions, I've ruled out the existence of a creator and of a mysterious, persistent part of ourselves (souls). That's not the case. Given strong evidence, or a powerful a priori argument for the existence of these things, I would accept that they do exist.

But even if I believed in them, I would still regard the word supernatural as meaningless for the reasons I've already given.

One could turn around your proposition to read, "There is no information that can be conveyed about the *natural* that doesn't use concepts that belong to *supernaturalism*." And indeed, this is exactly what the presuppositionalist argues: that the very conditions on which natural reality is made intelligible can only be rationally justified by reference to the supernatural.

What is the supernatural? until an answer is attempted you may as well be saying: "the very conditions on which natural reality is made intelligible can only be rationally justified by reference to the unintelligable.". You claim to have an answer to a set of questions about nature, but on examination your answers seem to amount "It's a mystery". So who's really 'throwing their hands up in the air' here?

If a theist, who's account of (for instance) the laws of logic boils down to "God puts logic in the universe, we don't know how", then it's trivial for a naturalists to explain the nature and origin of the things you mention (logic, abstractions etc) to at least the same degree of detail.

Logic

I take it you mean that man created logical laws to reflect the world's behavior. In other words, empirical investigation led to defining the laws of logic, which then must be a posteriori truths.

Not exactly. In my view the 'laws' of classical logic, the rules of thought, are hardwired by natural selection. Their presence is the consequence of our brains having evolved in a universe which behaves in a way that is (so far) reflected by those principles.

Uniformity of Nature

A. All observed A’s have been B’s. (true)
B. Nature is uniform, i.e., nature produces similar future results (true for the presuppositionalist).
C. All future A’s will be B’s (or All A’s are B’s) (true)

It is step B that cannot be rationally justified if one takes as his final reference point man in a purely materialist universe.

Step B contains an unjustified assumption. As I've explained (and as the grue problem demonstrates) assuming UoN does not entitle us to believe that the future will resemble the past in any useful way.

Your statement is accurate that inductive reasoning is sometimes flawed, as the black swan example illustrates, but it is hardly “epistemological[ly] useless.”

My claim was never that induction itself is epistemologically useless, but that assuming UoN is.

Science can only verify the truth of a theory through repeated observation and testing, which requires an assumption of the uniformity of nature.

Science is useful as long as the future continues to resemble the past in a predictable way. The truth or falsehood of UoN is irrelevant to this fact.