Bitbutter

"So the presuppositionalist uses the ideas he has about how his god behaved in the past and comes to the conclusion that god is very unlikely to break his promise about the uniformity of nature in the future."

Incorrect. You misunderstand the presuppositionalist's position by ignoring the core of his argument (which is indicated by his title): one *presupposes* the existence of a God whose very nature is one of order, consistency, and truth. It is against God's nature to lie, and thus His statement that He is the God "of order and not of chaos" is believed NOT by assuming His future actions will be like the past (as you seem to think), but rather because His very nature prevents Him from contradicting Himself. It is a logically valid argument that does not depend on induction to prove the result.

Your objection will naturally be that presupposing such a God is to reason in a circle (you start with God in order to prove His existence). The response is, "And so?" That is because EVERY worldview without exception is circular. For instance, the atheist starts with the assumption of a purely materialist universe to prove that the universe is purely materialist. He has ruled out the possibility of miracles or of the supernatural *from the very start*. In other words, the atheist has *presupposed* a purely materialist universe.

So the problem is not that the theist reasons in a circle; atheists do precisely the same thing. The problem is that only one of these worldviews is logically consistent and internally coherent. Only one provides a rational justification for things like the uniformity of nature, the laws of logic, the law of causality, the existence of abstractions, moral absolutes, and the like.

As you seem to admit in your post, the atheist can only throw his hands up in the air and claim that there is NO rational justification for any of these (at least, for the uniformity of nature). I commend you for your honesty. As the presumption of the uniformity of nature is absolutely necessary to make sense of the world (reality is simply unintelligible without it, as it is without the laws of logic, causality, or moral norms), then you should also be honest enough to admit that your position is fundamentally IRRATIONAL. Let me rephrase: if you admit you have no rational justification for the very preconditions that make reality intelligible at all, then you must admit your worldview is at bottom irrational.

And if so, then you have no authority whatsoever to criticize another's worldview for being irrational, as yours is par excellence, and by your own concession.

Incorrect. You misunderstand the presuppositionalist's position by ignoring the core of his argument (which is indicated by his title): one *presupposes* the existence of a God whose very nature is one of order, consistency, and truth. It is against God's nature to lie, and thus His statement that He is the God "of order and not of chaos" is believed NOT by assuming His future actions will be like the past (as you seem to think), but rather because His very nature prevents Him from contradicting Himself.

Thanks for the correction. I accept that this renders the first part of my article irrelevant.

The response is, "And so?" That is because EVERY worldview without exception is circular. For instance, the atheist starts with the assumption of a purely materialist universe to prove that the universe is purely materialist. He has ruled out the possibility of miracles or of the supernatural *from the very start*. In other words, the atheist has *presupposed* a purely materialist universe.

Your suggestion that atheism includes the presupposition that the material world is all there is glosses over some important detail.

Atheists like me are waiting for an explanation of what the supernatural actually is. Instead, when the supernatural is described, the description tells us what it's not (ie. its not natural). The problem is that the supernaturalist has specified no universe of discourse from which anything can be 'left over' once we've eliminated all the things that the supernatural isn't.

To make matters worse, anytime that a supernaturalist tells us anything about this realm, they borrow from naturalism. Even the word realm refers to a naturalistic concept. There is no information that can be conveyed about the supernatural that doesn't use concepts that belong to naturalism.

Until an adequate description of the supernatural is offered, and it doesn't look like one is possible, we have to conclude that supernatural is synonymous with non-existent.

Only one provides a rational justification for things like the uniformity of nature, the laws of logic, the law of causality, the existence of abstractions, moral absolutes, and the like.

I explained in my article why Uniformity of nature is useless as a ground for induction. You have not addressed this point. It's pretty important.

Naturalism can trivially 'account for' the laws of logic. Here's a sketch of how such an account might look: The laws of (classical) logic are not 'out there' governing the universe, but can be seen as description of how the universe behaves at a fundamental level.

If you provide explanations of how theism accounts for causality, mental abstractions etc, I will reply with possible accounts of how naturalism does the same. I believe that I will be able to match the level of detail in your answers.

As you seem to admit in your post, the atheist can only throw his hands up in the air and claim that there is NO rational justification for any of these (at least, for the uniformity of nature). As the presumption of the uniformity of nature is absolutely necessary to make sense of the world […]

False. Far from being absolutely necessary, assuming UoN is epistemological useless. See the Grue problem. Further, nature may not in fact be uniform. Even randomness throws up pockets of order. We may be experiencing such a pocket. So whether or not nature is in fact uniform doesn't change a thing as far as the reliability of our inductive inferences are concerned.

The Uniformity of nature that you imagine your God maintains notwithstanding, your inductive inferences lack a rational basis. As do mine.

Thanks for the thoughtful response. You’ve raised a number of points that must be dealt with, and I’ll try to do so as briefly as possible.

“[A]nytime that a supernaturalist tells us anything about this realm, they borrow from naturalism… There is no information that can be conveyed about the supernatural that doesn't use concepts that belong to naturalism.”

Your argument proves my point that you presuppose materialism (or naturalism) in order to prove it. You have ruled out the possibility of the supernatural from the start (e.g., the possibility that we are each created in God’s image, we have souls, and those souls have an innate sense of the supernatural). One could turn around your proposition to read, “There is no information that can be conveyed about the *natural* that doesn’t use concepts that belong to *supernaturalism*.” And indeed, this is exactly what the presuppositionalist argues: that the very conditions on which natural reality is made intelligible can only be rationally justified by reference to the supernatural.
To take just one example (and to address your point):

“The laws of (classical) logic are not 'out there' governing the universe, but can be seen as description of how the universe behaves at a fundamental level.”

I take it you mean that man created logical laws to reflect the world’s behavior. In other words, empirical investigation led to defining the laws of logic, which then must be a posteriori truths.

But this is not at all an explanation for logic. Logical concepts are a priori truths; they are the lens through which we view and make sense of the world; reality is unintelligible without them. They are a necessary part of our conceptual scheme, and they are what we impose upon the external world in order to make sense of it. Hume has already shown us that empirical investigation can only yield discrete occurrences of phenomena, with no necessary connection between any of them. Logical laws, however, concern only necessary connections. Thus, our minds must a priori supply them.

But how can our brains, if they are the result of blind, non-rational, impersonal, random forces, give rise to the concepts of logic? Stated another way, how can that which is particular, ever-changing, non-rational, and probabilistic (our observable universe) give rise to that which is universal, invariant, rational, and necessary? It cannot. This is why the purely naturalist universe cannot rationally justify the laws of logic.

Another problem is this: if logical laws are mere manmade convention, then they are by nature changeable from one society/epoch to the next (convention implies changeability). This produces an absurd result, such as that the law of identity (A=A) or the law of non-contradiction (A =/= -A) can somehow change.

“So the uniformity of nature, while being necessary in order for us to gain any advantage from our habit of induction, is useless if you want to establish a rational basis for inductive reasoning.”

Inductive reasoning justifies the uniformity of nature, and the uniformity of nature justifies induction. This is why Hume recognized the problem of any logical justification for induction; there is none. It’s a question-begging enterprise if one’s only reference point is finite man, who can have no knowledge of the future. If, however, one’s reference point is a God whose very character is one of order and consistency and whose universe reflects this, then the uniformity of nature is justified. Thus:

A. All observed A’s have been B’s. (true)
B. Nature is uniform, i.e., nature produces similar future results (true for the presuppositionalist).
C. All future A’s will be B’s (or All A’s are B’s) (true)

It is step B that cannot be rationally justified if one takes as his final reference point man in a purely materialist universe.

Your statement is accurate that inductive reasoning is sometimes flawed, as the black swan example illustrates, but it is hardly “epistemological[ly] useless.” Science can only verify the truth of a theory through repeated observation and testing, which requires an assumption of the uniformity of nature. In any case, the scientific community understands that its theories are never absolute, but assumed to be true until falsified by one or several counterexamples (thus, the “grue” problem is not really a problem).

The Supernatural.

You say that as part of my foundational assumptions, I've ruled out the existence of a creator and of a mysterious, persistent part of ourselves (souls). That's not the case. Given strong evidence, or a powerful a priori argument for the existence of these things, I would accept that they do exist.

But even if I believed in them, I would still regard the word supernatural as meaningless for the reasons I've already given.

One could turn around your proposition to read, "There is no information that can be conveyed about the *natural* that doesn't use concepts that belong to *supernaturalism*." And indeed, this is exactly what the presuppositionalist argues: that the very conditions on which natural reality is made intelligible can only be rationally justified by reference to the supernatural.

What is the supernatural? until an answer is attempted you may as well be saying: "the very conditions on which natural reality is made intelligible can only be rationally justified by reference to the unintelligable.". You claim to have an answer to a set of questions about nature, but on examination your answers seem to amount "It's a mystery". So who's really 'throwing their hands up in the air' here?

If a theist, who's account of (for instance) the laws of logic boils down to "God puts logic in the universe, we don't know how", then it's trivial for a naturalists to explain the nature and origin of the things you mention (logic, abstractions etc) to at least the same degree of detail.

Logic

I take it you mean that man created logical laws to reflect the world's behavior. In other words, empirical investigation led to defining the laws of logic, which then must be a posteriori truths.

Not exactly. In my view the 'laws' of classical logic, the rules of thought, are hardwired by natural selection. Their presence is the consequence of our brains having evolved in a universe which behaves in a way that is (so far) reflected by those principles.

Uniformity of Nature

A. All observed A’s have been B’s. (true)
B. Nature is uniform, i.e., nature produces similar future results (true for the presuppositionalist).
C. All future A’s will be B’s (or All A’s are B’s) (true)

It is step B that cannot be rationally justified if one takes as his final reference point man in a purely materialist universe.

Step B contains an unjustified assumption. As I've explained (and as the grue problem demonstrates) assuming UoN does not entitle us to believe that the future will resemble the past in any useful way.

Your statement is accurate that inductive reasoning is sometimes flawed, as the black swan example illustrates, but it is hardly “epistemological[ly] useless.”

My claim was never that induction itself is epistemologically useless, but that assuming UoN is.

Science can only verify the truth of a theory through repeated observation and testing, which requires an assumption of the uniformity of nature.

Science is useful as long as the future continues to resemble the past in a predictable way. The truth or falsehood of UoN is irrelevant to this fact.

I assume you are getting many of your arguments from the rational responders blog. I've dealt with similar arguments there, which rest on the same unexamined presuppositions, but will deal with yours in turn.

What is the supernatural? until an answer is attempted you may as well be saying: "the very conditions on which natural reality is made intelligible can only be rationally justified by reference to the unintelligable."

T'his is only the case if you presume that anything beyond the natural is unintelligible, which presumes that nothing beyond the natural exists. But why should I take your presuppositions as true? You take as your starting point that we can have no knowledge outside of the natural; but why should I accept your starting point as true? The theist from the outset rejects the idea that knowledge beyond the natural is impossible, because we are born with the "imprint" of the supernatural, and it is thus intelligible to us. There is nothing contradictory about this if one presumes the supernatural exists. It is only contradictory if one takes as his starting point–as you do–that only a purely naturalist universe exists.

Logic
In my view the 'laws' of classical logic, the rules of thought, are hardwired by natural selection. Their presence is the consequence of our brains having evolved in a universe which behaves in a way that is (so far) reflected by those principles.

I agree that logic is hardwired into our brains, but not as a result of blind, impersonal, non-rational forces (after all, how can blind, impersonal, non-rational forces give rise to the rational?).

Science is useful as long as the future continues to resemble the past in a predictable way. The truth or falsehood of UoN is irrelevant to this fact.

You'll have to clarify your meaning here, because as it is, it makes no sense. The assumption of the uniformity of nature is precisely the assumption that the future will continue to resemble the past in a predictable way.

Some of your quotations in my response are not set apart as such (I guess your site doesn't accept html tags?). In any case, I assume you'll be able to filter out those which are yours from mine…

The Supernatural

T'his is only the case if you presume that anything beyond the natural is unintelligible, which presumes that nothing beyond the natural exists. But why should I take your presuppositions as true? You take as your starting point that we can have no knowledge outside of the natural; but why should I accept your starting point as true?

You're mischaracterising my position. My starting point does not include the specification that Quaddle can't exist. Nor does it specify that the Supernatural can't exist. But until someone offers a coherent explanation of exactly what these things are, their non-existence has to be assumed.

The rest of your opening paragraph reads something like this to me:

The Quaddlist from the outset rejects the idea that knowledge beyond the Quaddle-less is impossible, because we are born with the "imprint" of the Quaddle, and it is thus intelligible to us. There is nothing contradictory about this if one presumes that Quaddle exists. It is only contradictory if one takes as his starting point–as you do–that only a purely Quaddle-less universe exists.

Before the claims of the supernaturalist can be taken seriously, he has to explain what the supernatural is.

And 'Beyond the natural' is meaningless, not because I simply assume that the natural is all there is, but because supernaturalists have failed to tell us anything about the imagined set that includes both the natural and whatever else there is, except in terms of the natural.

In other words they have shown themselves to be incapable of specifying a universe of discourse that leaves anything over once the natural is subtracted.

Logic

I agree that logic is hardwired into our brains, but not as a result of blind, impersonal, non-rational forces (after all, how can blind, impersonal, non-rational forces give rise to the rational?).

Why assume that they cannot? It's only your assumption that rationality has to be something magical that leads you to say this kind of thing. In fact, the standard presup arguments follow the same form: How can something magical exist in a universe without magic?

In my experience here's how the conversation tends to go on: The naturalists answer, in each case, is that the thing in question is not magical, and so can exist in a non-magical universe. At this point the naturalist has 'accounted for' the thing that the presupper insists that they cannot account for. The apologetic has been defeated, and the remainder of the discussion consists of the presupper resisting the obvious fact that his 'explanation' for these things (God did it) is in no way a better explanation than the one the naturalist has given.

Back to your question again:

after all, how can blind, impersonal, non-rational forces give rise to the rational?)

Natural selection answers a huge part of this puzzle. But there are still gaps in our knowledge. We don't have a full understanding of how the brain works, or how it evolved. So if you recursively ask for explanations of a naturalists initial answer, there'll come a point at which they will say "i don't know".

How can God inject logic into the universe? If I repeatedly ask for you to explain your answers you'll quickly be forced to say "I don't know" too.

You assume that certain things in the universe are magical. This assumption leads you to reject accounts of these things that don't include magic. The irony is that, as a presuppositionalist, you should be in a better position than most to realise that it's your presuppositions that lead you to conclude that non-magical accounts for these things can't be valid. Presup fails because it's practitioners import assumptions from their own w/view when trying to show failings of other w/views. Their attempts at internally critiquing atheistic w/views are all spoiled by this oversight.

So there are two main problems with your approach (presup)

1. No matter how strenuously presuppositionists deny it, the presup apologetic relies on the God of the Gaps fallacy. As with the lightening storm example, an honest "I don't know" is better than making stuff up (God did it). This example makes it obvious that an inability to 'account for' an aspect of existence that the person takes for granted does not invalidate a persons w/view.

2. Naturalists are perfectly capable of 'accounting for' the things that presuppositionalists challenge them to explain. Presuppositionalists don't like the answers because they don't depend on magic, but in the context of an internal critique of naturalism, the presuppositionalist is powerless to mount a valid objection to the naturalist's account.

Uniformity of Nature

You'll have to clarify your meaning here, because as it is, it makes no sense. The assumption of the uniformity of nature is precisely the assumption that the future will continue to resemble the past in a predictable way.

I hope you'll take a second look at the Grue problem. I think you'll see why it shows that assuming UoN doesn't provide rational justification for the belief that the future will resemble the past in a predictable way.

My starting point does not…specify that the Supernatural can't exist. But until someone offers a coherent explanation of exactly what these things are, their non-existence has to be assumed.

You contradict yourself. You say you don't assume the supernatural doesn't exist, yet you must assume the supernatural doesn't exist. Why must you assume the supernatural doesn't exist? Why must the theist accept your starting point that we must begin with the natural? You begin with the presupposition that all that exists is the natural, and think that only if there is sufficient "evidence" for the supernatural will you believe. But if you've read W.V.O. Quine, Wittgenstein, or any number of 20th century epistemologists, you know that this is simply not the way these things proceed. I could present you with, e.g., evidence of what many deem to be a miracle, yet because of your naturalist assumptions, you will search for a naturalistic explanation–and if one is lacking, you will not immediately believe. Instead, you will wait for a naturalistic explanation to unfurl sometime in the unknown future. This is always how atheists respond to "evidence" for belief; their presuppositions are fundamentally opposed to the possibility of the supernatural, and therefore any so-called evidence is never sufficient, because they will always wait for a naturalistic explanation to come along. Even if one never does, they will continue to wait in *faith* for a naturalistic explanation. This is why examining one's presuppositions is crucial to this discussion, rather than simply asserting that further "facts" or "evidence" will change one's mind. It won't.

[S]upernaturalists have failed to tell us anything about the imagined set that includes both the natural and whatever else there is, except in terms of the natural.

Once again, your naturalist presuppositions rear their head. You define everything in terms of the natural–but how do you know that it is not the other way around? How do you know that the universe is rather a reflection of the supernatural? That the laws of logic, for instance, reflect the mind of God, or that nature displays a certain order after the internal consistency of God? You see, once again, you presuppose the naturalist position in order to prove it, while the theist rejects your presuppositions and assumes everything is defined in terms of the *supernatural*. Your naturalist presuppositions are so hardwired into your thinking that you simply cannot accept the possibility that, philosophically speaking, it's just *one* worldview that in no way obligates anyone else to accept it. It cannot be proven, except by circular reference to itself.

In answer to my question about how the rational can arise from the blind, impersonal, and irrational, you ask, "Why assume that they cannot?" and say, essentially, "That's just how it is." Again, this is not a rational explanation. That is fine if this is the position you take, but it is not a rationally coherent position. Let's at least be clear on this.

You then say, "Natural selection answers a huge part of this puzzle." Again, this doesn't answer the question. Are you saying, then, that natural selection is guided by a rational force? If so, what is this mysterious force, in a universe that is supposedly made of blind, impersonal, irrational forces?

How can God inject logic into the universe? If I repeatedly ask for you to explain your answers you'll quickly be forced to say "I don't know" too.

Actually, I can provide a rational explanation. God does not "inject" logic into anything. The theist believes God has created all things, and that the human beings especially bear the imprint of God. Our minds therefore reflect the rationality of God. We are born with it, and our thinking reflects the thinking of God. This is a rational account for the laws of logic. You may not *like* the account, but it is a rational one, nonetheless.

You assume that certain things in the universe are magical.

I assume nothing to be magical. The theist takes as his starting point the existence of the supernatural. There is nothing "magical" about the supernatural; it has always existed, and underlies everything we understand about the world. Once again, your naturalist presuppositions reject this outright. But why should the theist accept your naturalist presuppositions?

Again, the TAG is not a "God of the gaps" argument. It is a transcendental argument, and takes the form: X is a precondition of Y. Y exists, therefore X must exist. The "God of the gaps" argument has more to do with providing an evidential explanation for certain observable phenomena. I don't hold to a "God of the gaps" theory for scientific phenomena, and I think it's a faulty argument.

I said:

My starting point does not…specify that the Supernatural can't exist. But until someone offers a coherent explanation of exactly what these things are, their non-existence has to be assumed.

You said:

You contradict yourself. You say you don't assume the supernatural doesn't exist, yet you must assume the supernatural doesn't exist. Why must you assume the supernatural doesn't exist?

There is no contradiction there if you read it carefully. I don't assume that the Supernatural can't exist. Just as I don't assume that lobsters can't exist. But my starting point is that I have no knowledge about what either of these things are supposed to be. Not knowing what a lobster is, it's senseless to suppose that whatever that label refers to, exists. The same applies to the supernatural. First somebody needs to explain what it is.

I could present you with, e.g., evidence of what many deem to be a miracle, yet because of your naturalist assumptions, you will search for a naturalistic explanation–and if one is lacking, you will not immediately believe. Instead, you will wait for a naturalistic explanation to unfurl sometime in the unknown future. […] This is why examining one's presuppositions is crucial to this discussion, rather than simply asserting that further "facts" or "evidence" will change one's mind. It won't.

It's a risky tactic to tell your opponent what he thinks, instead of asking him. You got it wrong. I reject miracle stories not because I presuppose that miracles can't happen, but because the nature of my firm everyday experience leads be to attribute an extremely low initial likelihood to miracle claims. I attribute a very low initial likelihood to other things too if they don't sit well with my past experience.

Despite all this, if I had access to very strong evidence, I would come to believe that a miracle did happen. Though I still wouldn't be any the wiser about what the supernatural is supposed to be.

You define everything in terms of the natural–but how do you know that it is not the other way around? […] except by circular reference to itself.

As soon as someone can explain what 'the supernatural' is, I can give the question serious consideration.

In answer to my question about how the rational can arise from the blind, impersonal, and irrational, you ask, "Why assume that they cannot?" and say, essentially, "That's just how it is." Again, this is not a rational explanation.

I'm not offering "That's just how it is" as an explanation. I hoped to convey the idea that while can say a lot about how the rational arose in the universe, we don't have the complete picture. The lack of a complete alternative account in no way obliges anyone to accept the theist's explanatorily useless, ad hoc answer which reduces to 'God did it, somehow'.

I assume nothing to be magical. The theist takes as his starting point the existence of the supernatural. There is nothing "magical" about the supernatural;

What you just said is exactly as meaningless to me as the following paragraph:

I assume nothing to be supernatural. I take as my starting point the existence of the magical. There is nothing "supernatural" about the magical; it has always existed, and underlies everything we understand about the world.

Magical and supernatural: both words are invoked when a person wishes to claim that an event occurred by no mechanism, or that the mechanism is forever out of the reach of science. Since neither label has been explained I've taken my cue from how they are used and consider them to be interchangeable.

Again, the TAG is not a "God of the gaps" argument.

The pattern is: Ask a question that the atheist does not have a complete answer for. Point out that theism answers that question. Imply that theism is therefore superior.

TAG is a variant of God of the Gaps because it depends on ignoring the fact that 'we don't know' is a good answer, and may be preferable to an incorrect one.

You state several times that all you need is for the supernatural to be "explained" to you. But you have shown by your previous arguments that you are closed to any explanation of the supernatural, because to discuss the supernatural or the transcendent is to discuss that which is meaningless and unintelligible, according to you.

This shows that, despite what you say, you do indeed assume the supernatural cannot exist. You have ruled out its possibility by disallowing discussion of the supernatural, because you have taken as your starting point the "fact" that only the natural exists. Your presuppositions lead you to your conclusion.

There are explanations for the supernatural out there, if you are willing to look for them. But you seem closed to the possibility, because, as I keep pointing out but you continue to deny, you have already ruled out the possibility from the start.

As to the TAG, its argument is that a purely naturalist universe leads one to moral and logical absurdity, and is rationally incoherent. At bottom, the atheist must admit that he simply cannot rationally account for things like the laws of logic, moral norms, uniformity of nature, or any other preconditions of knowledge that make reality intelligible. Without these, we can know nothing at all (and the Uniformity of Nature is something that must be presumed to be true by any scientist, even if its nature disallows 100% accuracy; this is why the Grue problem is not a real problem). The theist has a rational explanation. It may not be an explanation atheists like, but it is rational nonetheless. This is why the theist is perfectly justified in claiming that his worldview is rationally superior to the atheist worldview.

By the way, I'll give you the last word on this. I'm beginning to feel we are going in circles…

There are a few things that we do in fact know. Each of us knows that he or she thinks, not that others do, but that he or she does. Evidence of one's own thought processes is apparent because it is not subject to the imperfection of perception, i.e. it is internal. From here we can assume all prerequisites for thinking, the first being a thinker. I think, therefore I am a thinker. I am aware of my thinking therefore I have an awareness. This does not work for activities besides thinking because there is some level of uncertainty. If you say "I'm running" it's because you think you're running (or you could be lying, but let's just assume honesty in this scenario). For all you know, your perceptions could be fake, so you may not be running, but your thoughts about running are real thoughts even if they're wrong. Because I am aware of my thoughts I know I must exist. So far I've concluded that I am aware that I think, therefore I'm a thinker with an awareness, therefore I am something, therefore I am (exist). I have no idea what I am (other than a self), and whether anything I perceive is real. This is at least similar to Descartes's argument, but I haven't read all of his work so I don't know much beyond cogito ergo sum. The fact that what we perceive is either reality or an illusion is further proof of a self because if it's real then so am I, an if it's an illusion then it has to be illuding something, me. That was all deductive reasoning, so I did little to help prove or disprove the validity of inductive reasoning. If space exists then I'm here. I exist now, but that doesn't prove that I existed before now or will after now.

There doesn't have to be a reason that things in the past have always (as far as I'm aware) followed patterns (gravity, +/- attraction, et cetera), but they have. You can't even really prove that there was a past. Thinking doesn't even prove a past because at any instant I could just start existing with a bunch of memories and only exist for an instant.

A great start but poor finish. First off I agree with you Bitbutter.

However, you conceded on your first point which had him dead in the water.

This statement……
"one *presupposes* the existence of a God whose very nature is one of order, consistency, and truth. "

This is an imaginary god that he just made up.
It is like a mathamatical formula with no unknowns.

I can presuppose a god of disorder, inconsistency and untruth.
Who am I to tell GOD what she can or cannot be or do.

He certainly did not get this god from the Bible, Koran, or any other religious book.

I can presuppose that some undiscovered planet in the sirus system has intelligent life on it, are you going to concede that to me? And by the way my god lives on this planet, and she created the universe.
If you do, then we will have nothing but MY imagination to debate, and you cannot win that debate, because my mind has all the evidense it needs to believe these things.

And, if my concept of god came from the bible why would anyone of SOUND mind presuppose that god had only these qualities (order, consistency, and truth), considering god made man in his image?

Man has these qualities, but man also has many other qualities that do not jibe with his presuppositions about the nature of god!

Other than mans lack of power to perform supernatural events, man and the god of the bible have all the same emotions, and faults, except god's are on a grander scale.

Please e-mail me what you think about my comment.

Dale701